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7 Abstract Cost-effectiveness (CE) thresholds are being
8 discussed more frequently and there have been many new
9 developments in this area; however, there is a lack of
10 understanding about what thresholds mean and their
11 implications. This paper provides an overview of the CE
12 threshold literature. First, the meaning of a CE threshold
13 and the key assumptions involved (perfect divisibility,
14 marginal increments in budget, etc.) are highlighted using a
15 hypothetical example, and the use of historic/heuristic
16 estimates of the threshold is noted along with their limi-
17 tations. Recent endeavours to estimate the empirical value
18 of the thresholds, both from the supply side and the demand
19 side, are then presented. The impact on CE thresholds of
20 future directions for the field, such as thresholds across
21 sectors and the incorporation of multiple criteria beyond
22 quality-adjusted life-years as a measure of ‘value’, are
23 highlighted. Finally, a number of common issues and
24 misconceptions associated with CE thresholds are
25 addressed.
26
27
28
Key Points for Decision Makers
29
31
32
33This paper describes the meaning of a cost-
34effectiveness (CE) threshold, along with the
35assumptions involved using a simple hypothetical
36example, and highlights some of the common issues
37and misconceptions associated with thresholds.
38CE thresholds that are being used across the world
39might be considered overestimates and have no
40empirical basis as they are based on historical
41estimates, heuristics or judgements.
42Empirical estimates of the supply-side threshold
43could be considered more appropriate for judging the
44cost effectiveness of new technologies if the aim was
45to maximize population health. 6
47
481 Introduction
49Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) is used to estimate the
50value for money (VfM) of new interventions in many
51countries across the world. In practice, the results of CEA
52are commonly expressed as the ratio of incremental costs to
53effectiveness outcomes, or incremental cost-effectiveness
54ratios (ICERs). Effectiveness is generally measured using a
55generic measure of health, typically quality-adjusted life-
56years (QALYs) or disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs).
57ICERs (i.e. cost per QALY gained or cost per DALY
58avoided incremental to the next best alternative) are then
59compared with a cost-effectiveness (CE) threshold to
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60 identify whether the new intervention is good VfM. Inter-
61 ventions with an ICER below a threshold (i.e. if they add
62 each QALY or avert each DALY at a lower cost than the
63 threshold) are considered cost effective, while those with
64 an ICER above the threshold are not.1
65 Despite the widespread recognition and use of CE
66 thresholds by researchers conducting economic evaluations
67 [1, 2], as well as the adoption of their use into policy in
68 some countries (e.g. the UK, Australia and Canada) [3–6],
69 there is a lack of understanding among many about the
70 meaning of thresholds, the assumptions involved, and their
71 implications. Whether a given intervention is cost-effective
72 or not depends on how much health it would generate and
73 whether that amount is greater than the health that could
74 have been generated if the money required to fund it had
75 been spent on something else, which is a measure of
76 opportunity cost. As such, using a CE threshold to reflect
77 this perspective has come to be known as a ‘supply side’
78 approach [7–10]. When non-health impacts on private
79 consumption are also considered important, some assess-
80 ment of the equivalent consumption value of health is
81 required, i.e. ‘demand side’ empirical research [10]. Such
82 approaches aim to represent societal willingness to pay
83 (WTP) for additional health gains, i.e. what individuals are
84 willing to forego in non-healthcare/private consumption for
85 gains in healthcare. When considering budget constraints
86 on a healthcare system, supply-side thresholds can be
87 considered more relevant since displacements to current
88 health-generating interventions must happen to fund new
89 interventions [11].
90 The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to provide an
91 illustration of the CE threshold using a hypothetical
92 example to highlight the key assumptions involved; (2) to
93 describe the various thresholds that are in use as policy
94 tools in countries or have been estimated by researchers
95 (sometimes, though not always overlapping—see the
96 example of the UK); and (3) to present the new develop-
97 ments and ongoing areas of research around thresholds.
98 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
99 tion 2 presents a simple hypothetical example to illustrate
100 how the CE threshold can be determined using the ‘league
101 table’ approach, as well as optimization techniques and the
102 assumptions involved. Section 3 describes the use of his-
103 toric/heuristic estimates of the threshold, along with their
104 limitations. Then, in Sect. 4, recent endeavours to estimate
105 the empirical value of thresholds (e.g. work on opportunity
106 costs in UK, Australia, Spain, as well as work in estimating
107 thresholds for low- to middle-income countries [LMICs])
108 will be presented. Section 5 presents future directions for
109the field (thresholds across sectors such as social care,
110incorporating multiple criteria beyond QALYs) and their
111impact on CE thresholds. Finally, Sect. 6 addresses some of
112the common issues and misconceptions associated with CE
113thresholds.
1142 An (Hypothetical) Example
115In this section, a simple hypothetical example is used to
116illustrate how the CE threshold can be determined using a
117‘league table’ approach and optimization techniques [12].
118We further outline the assumptions involved in each. Let us
119assume there is a fixed healthcare budget of £50 million
120available and the aim is to choose interventions to place in
121the healthcare package to maximize the total QALYs
122gained. In this example, for the sake of simplicity, the
123healthcare package is empty to start with and there are
124seven mutually exclusive, independent interventions to
125choose from, each with a different set of costs and QALYs
126gained, as shown in Table 1. Note that these are incre-
127mental costs and QALYs associated with each intervention
128compared with the ‘do nothing’ option. At first glance, it is
129obvious that the budget of £50 million is not enough to
130fund all interventions.
1312.1 League Table Approach
132Under certain assumptions, which are outlined below, this
133‘league table’ approach [13] can be used to identify the
134optimal allocation by including interventions according to
135highest VfM until the available budget is exhausted. Given
136our aim is to maximize health, the measure of ‘value’ in
137our example is QALYs. As we started with an empty
138package and are considering only independent options, we
139calculate VfM by dividing the costs by the QALYs of each
140intervention, as presented in the fourth column of Table 2
141(i.e. they represent the ICERs for each intervention
1FL01 1 CE thresholds reflecting opportunity costs can also be used to
1FL02 calculate the net benefit of an intervention (i.e. if net health benefit,
1FL03 benefit in terms of health over and above health opportunity costs).
Table 1 Costs and QALYs associated with the available
interventions
Intervention Cost (million £) QALYs
A 32 7000
B 22 4000
C 20 3500
D 10 2000
E 12 1900
F 4 600
G 3 400
QALYs quality-adjusted life-years
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F142 compared with the ‘do nothing’ option). The next steps143 involve sorting the interventions based on their VfM and144 adding the interventions to the package sequentially until
145 the budget runs out, as illustrated in the fifth and sixth
146 columns of Table 2, respectively. This process is described
147 in detail in the next paragraph.
148 As shown in Table 2, intervention A has a ranking of 1
149 (i.e. provides the best VfM), therefore it is added to the
150 healthcare package first. Intervention A generates 7000
151 QALYs at the rate of £4571/QALY, with a total cost of
152 £32 million, therefore there is £18 million still left from
153 the overall budget of £50 million. The next best interven-
154 tion is D, which costs £10 million and provides 2000
155 QALYs at the rate of £5000/QALY. After incorporating
156 intervention D into the healthcare package, there is
157 £8 million still left, which can be spent on the next best
158 intervention, B. However, £8 million is not enough to fund
159 intervention B in full (with a cost of £22 million), there-
160 fore, we can only fund a portion (8 million/£22 mil-
161 lion = 0.36) within the budget. This would result in a gain
162 of 1454.5 QALYs (i.e. 0.36*4000 QALYs) from inter-
163 vention B at the rate of £5500/QALY. In total, we achieved
164 10,454.5 QALYs (7000 QALYs from A, 2000 QALYs
165 from D, and 1454.5 QALYs from B) for the £50 million
166 budget (see the Microsoft Excel file in the electronic sup-
167 plementary material [ESM] for a visual illustration of this
168 approach as a ‘bookshelf’) [7, 14].
169 In this example, the cost per QALY of the last inter-
170 vention included (£5500 per QALY for intervention B)
171 represents the supply-side threshold where that last inter-
172 vention is considered ‘marginal’ (i.e. would be displaced
173 first). The necessary assumptions required for this to be
174 true are outlined in the ‘Underlying Assumptions’ section.
175 2.2 Budget-Constrained Optimization
176 Mathematical programming techniques can also be used to
177 identify the optimal allocation that maximizes the total
178 QALYs gained within the budget constraint [15, 16] (see
179ESM for the solution of the budget-constrained optimiza-
180tion problem). It can be seen that the optimal solution
181achieved is the same as that found using the league
182table approach. However, these two approaches find the
183same result only under a strict set of assumptions (perfect
184divisibility, linearity, and independence), which are
185described later in the ‘Underlying Assumptions’ section.
186If the budget is bigger, say £51 million, we could gain a
187further 181.8 QALYs by spending the additional £1 mil-
188lion on intervention B. In fact, at the current allocation of
189the £50 million budget (A, B, and D), 0.0001818 additional
190QALYs can be gained for every £1 increase in the budget.
191In optimization terminology, this is termed the shadow
192price, i.e. how much the objective (QALYs) would increase
193for a one-unit increase in the constraint (budget). The
194shadow price can also be presented as decrements, i.e. how
195much the objective (QALYs) would decrease for a one-unit
196decrease in the constraint (budget). In our example,
1970.0001818 is the shadow price of the £50 million budget
198optimally allocated. It should be noted that this shadow
199price is the inverse of the cost per QALY of the last
200intervention included (£5500 per QALY for intervention
201B). Also note that this shadow price is only applicable for a
202range of budget between £42 million (i.e. total costs of
203fully funded A and D) and £64 million (i.e. total costs of
204fully funded A, D, and B).
205The inverse of the shadow price at the optimal allocation
206in the budget, referred to as the ‘critical ratio’ in one of the
207first mentions of the threshold in published literature [17],
208represents the ‘supply side’ definition of the CE threshold,
209i.e. a threshold representing the notion of opportunity cost.
210Whether a given intervention is cost effective or not thus
211depends on how much health it would generate and whe-
212ther that amount is greater than the health that could have
213been generated if the money required to fund it had been
214spent on something else, which is a measure of opportunity
215cost.
Table 2 Costs and QALYs
associated with the available
interventions
Intervention Cost
(million £)
QALYs Value for money
(cost per QALY)
Ranking Included in the healthcare package
with a £50 million budget
A 32 7000 £4571 1 Yes (100%)
B 22 4000 £5500 3 Yes (partly funded, 36%)
C 20 3500 £5714 4 No
D 10 2000 £5000 2 Yes (100%)
E 12 1900 £6316 5 No
F 4 600 £6667 6 No
G 3 400 £7500 7 No
Maximum QALYs gained with £50 million budget: 7000? 2000? (0.36 9 4000) = 10,454.5 QALYs
QALYs quality-adjusted life-years
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216 2.3 Assessing Cost-Effectiveness
217 With this allocation of the £50 million budget, for a new
218 intervention X to be included in the healthcare package (X
219 does not have to be from the existing list in Table 1), we
220 would need to disinvest first (assuming the overall budget
221 is fixed at £50 million). This disinvestment is only worth-
222 while if the replacement of existing interventions in the
223 current healthcare package with X brings positive net
224 QALYs gained. Let us introduce a new intervention X that
225 costs £5.2 million and provides 1000 QALYs at the rate of
226 £5200 per QALY (Table 3). Given the existing allocation
227 (A, B and D), the decision is whether we should fund X.
228 As illustrated earlier, the threshold is the inverse of the
229 shadow price of the budget with its current optimal allo-
230 cation, which is £5500 per QALY (i.e. the cost per QALY
231 of the last intervention included, intervention B). Since
232 £5200/QALY (VfM of X) is lower than £5500/QALY
233 (current inverse of the shadow price), it is cost effective to
234 replace B with X. That is, more QALYs can be gained by
235 spending money on X than those lost by displacing part of
236 B. In this case, X will be funded from the replacement of
237 part of B, the proportion of B left after funding X is esti-
238 mated as follows: (£8–5.2 million)/£22 million = 12.7%.
239 Replacing B with X would generate 1509.1 QALYs for the
240 £8 million (i.e. 1000 QALYs from X? 0.127*4000 QALYs
241 from part of B). In total, we achieve 10,509.1 QALYs (7000
242 QALYs from A, 2000 QALYs from D, 1000 QALYs from
243 X, and 509.1 QALYs from B) for the £50 million budget, an
244 increase of 54.6 QALYs (10,509.1- 10,454.5 = 54.6
245 QALYs) compared with the previous allocation.
246 2.4 Underlying Assumptions
247 Through this example, we illustrate below a few key
248 assumptions relating to CE thresholds that are worth fur-
249 ther consideration, i.e. perfect divisibility, linearity, inde-
250 pendence, marginal increments in budget, disinvestment
251 plan, perfect information and other issues [14, 18].
252 2.4.1 Perfect Divisibility, Linearity and Independence
253 One assumption that applies to both the league table ap-
254 proach and the budget-constrained optimization example
255is the notion of perfect divisibility (i.e. a proportion of the
256intervention can be funded if there are not enough funds
257to cover the costs of the whole intervention). In the above
258example for the optimal allocation (before X was intro-
259duced), the £8 million left was not enough to cover the
260whole of intervention B (£22 million) and it was assumed
261that intervention B can be funded in part
262(0.36 = £8 million/£22 million) within the remaining
263budget, resulting in a gain of 1454.5 QALYs from B
264(assuming linearity, i.e. increase in costs results in a
265proportional linear increase in QALYs, also known as
266‘constant returns to scale’). It should be noted that the
267assumption of perfect divisibility may not always hold
268true in real life; for example, if there is a need for
269expensive specialist equipment, it must be purchased in
270full as a fraction of equipment cannot be bought. In
271addition, while the perfect divisibility may be achieved by
272limiting the patient population receiving the technology
273(e.g. by subgroup), the linearity assumption may not be
274valid (e.g. as the costs and QALYs for the subgroup may
275be different from the overall population).
276It should be noted that the league table approach cannot
277be used if the perfect divisibility assumption does not hold.
278In case of the optimization, the problem needs to be solved
279again using integer constraints. In the above example, the
280resulting optimal solution with integer programming (be-
281fore X was introduced) is to fund interventions A, D, F and
282G in full to achieve 10,000 QALYs for a budget of
283£49 million (see the Integer Optimization sheet in the
284Microsoft Excel file in the ESM). This is because even
285though there are interventions with better VfM than F and
286G, they are not affordable within the leftover available
287budget after funding A and D (i.e. interventions B, C and E
288cost more than £8 million).
289Similar issues arise when considering interventions that
290are interdependent—VfM techniques are not applicable
291and optimization techniques should be used to account for
292the interactions [19]. These issues arise because the league
293table approach assumes perfect divisibility, linearity and
294independence and is based on the use of cost per QALY
295ratios without considering budget impact. While the opti-
296mization problem can be structured using integer pro-
297gramming to overcome these issues, the shadow prices are
Table 3 Introducing intervention X to the currently optimal allocation
Intervention Cost (million £) QALYs Value for money (cost per QALY) Ranking
Existing intervention A 32 7000 £4571 1
Existing intervention B 22 4000 £5500 4
Existing intervention D 10 2000 £5000 2
New intervention X 5.2 1000 £5200 3
QALYs quality-adjusted life-years
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298 no longer applicable for these methods (and thus the
299 thresholds are not easily interpretable).
300 2.4.2 Marginal Budget Impact
301 The threshold, the inverse of the shadow price or the cost
302 per QALY of the last intervention included, is only
303 applicable for interventions with a small impact on budget,
304 typically termed ‘marginal’ impacts on budget. In the
305 example above, the new intervention X had a budget
306 impact of £5.2 million, which meant only intervention B
307 needed to be displaced, hence the threshold of £5500/
308 QALY. If the budget impact of X was high (which in our
309 example is any amount above £8 million, the money spent
310 on intervention B), it would be necessary to consider
311 whether it is cost effective to also replace the next existing
312 intervention in the package (intervention D) with X since
313 there is still room to fund more X. Now, the £5500 per
314 QALY from the inverse of the shadow price is no longer
315 applicable.2 We need to compare the VfM of X (£5200 per
316 QALY) with that of D (£5000 per QALY). Since £5200 per
317 QALY is greater than £5000 per QALY, X should not
318 replace D. Thus, as seen in the above example, while the
319 threshold can be considered appropriate at marginal
320 impacts on budget, the value of the threshold needs to be
321 more conservative for interventions with higher budget
322 impacts to accommodate the displacement of more cost-
323 effective interventions. As such, many countries have
324 started to impose a ‘budget impact limit’ alongside CE
325 considerations (see Sect. 6.4).
326 2.4.3 Disinvestment Plan
327 In our example, we assume that the disinvestment to fund
328 a new intervention should come from the least cost-ef-
329 fective intervention(s). The new intervention was only
330 compared with the least cost effective existing interven-
331 tion within the optimal allocation, to keep with our
332 original aim of maximizing QALYs. Replacing interven-
333 tions other than the least cost-effective intervention (i.e.
334 anything other than the intervention with least VfM) in
335 our healthcare package will result in greater QALYs lost
336 than when displacing least cost-effective intervention.
337 However, it is not always possible to ensure that the least
338 cost-effective intervention(s) are disinvested first or that
339 the healthcare package is ‘optimal’ [20]. Healthcare
340 packages in real-life settings tend to include a mix of
341 interventions that are cost effective as well as cost
342ineffective, and there might not be information on what
343interventions are being displaced. Thus, the empirical
344estimates of the ‘supply-side threshold’ use marginal
345productivity of the system, which describes the relation-
346ship between changes in healthcare expenditure and
347health outcomes (i.e. change in the QALYs of the
348healthcare system with change in the budget—see
349Sect. 4.1).
3502.4.4 Perfect Information (and Other Assumptions)
351In our example, we assume that we start with an empty
352healthcare package and that the information (i.e. the overall
353budget, the interventions available, and the data on costs
354and QALYs for all interventions) is already known. Our
355example is a very simple approximation, whereas the
356reality of healthcare resource allocation is much more
357complex. For instance, the budget may vary with time (and
358in fact there could be different budgets to consider); there
359may be complementarities between interventions (e.g.
360early diagnostic interventions would improve the benefits
361of treatment interventions, violating the independence
362assumption); and the healthcare package may already
363include many pre-existing interventions (where the impli-
364cations of disinvestment may need to be considered first).
365Furthermore, full knowledge of costs and benefits for all
366interventions required to estimate the threshold value is
367usually incomplete (i.e. the data required, either to develop
368the comprehensive league table or to formulate the opti-
369mization problem, to determine the threshold value is not
370available).
3713 Past: Use of Heuristics/Historical Estimates
372of Thresholds
373Given the challenges highlighted in specifying a threshold
374consistent with QALY maximization in the earlier sec-
375tion, many countries use a threshold value based on other
376methods and representing different concepts. For exam-
377ple, in line with previous WHO-CHOICE guidance
378[8, 21], some LMICs have employed a heuristic of one to
379three times the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita
380[22, 23], while the UK, Ireland and the US use explicit
381thresholds broadly based on historical estimates/judge-
382ment [24, 25]. Many countries (including Canada, Brazil,
383Australia, and Sweden) do not specify an explicit
384threshold at all [4, 26]. This section briefly summarises
385how the thresholds based on heuristics or historical esti-
386mates, whether explicit or implied, are used across the
387world.
2FL01 2 As described earlier, the shadow price of 0.0001818 relates to
2FL02 intervention B and as such is only applicable for a range of budgets
2FL03 between £42 million (i.e. total costs of fully funded A and D) and
2FL04 £64 million (i.e. total costs of fully funded A, D and B).
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388 3.1 Explicit Thresholds
389 3.1.1 UK (National Institute for Health and Care
390 Excellence)
391 The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence
392 (NICE) in the UK is a high-profile example of the use of
393 explicit CE thresholds, and its guidance recommends in
394 favour of funding interventions with an ICER below a
395 threshold of £20,000/QALY or £30,000/QALY, and also
396 recommends against funding interventions with an ICER
397 above these thresholds [27–29]. However, a higher
398 threshold (i.e. £50,000/QALY) is used for life-extending
399 treatments for small patient populations at the end of life,
400 i.e. treatments that offer an extension to life greater than
401 3 months compared with current treatment in the National
402 Health Service (NHS); are for patients with a short life
403 expectancy, i.e. normally\24 months; and are for small
404 patient populations, normally not exceeding a cumulative
405 total of 7000 patients for all licensed indications in England
406 [30]. Despite this guidance, interventions with ICERs
407 above £30,000 or £50,000 are often accepted, even when
408 lacking the requisite special evidence needed [31].
409 3.1.2 Ireland
410 The CE of all new medicines in Ireland is considered by the
411 National Centre for Pharmacoeconomics (NCPE), in col-
412 laboration with the Health Service Executive (HSE), the
413 public body with responsibility for delivering state-funded
414 healthcare in Ireland. The Irish Pharmaceutical Healthcare
415 Association (IPHA) and HSE have an agreement that
416 explicitly states that the QALY threshold to be used in the
417 HTA process is €45,000 [32]. This value is also confirmed
418 on the NCPE website [33]. It is worth noting that, unlike
419 NICE, NCPE’s recommendations are not mandatory and
420 can be overruled by the minister/HSE [25].
421 3.1.3 US
422 While $50,000 per QALY has been mentioned anecdotally
423 in the past in the US [34], the recent value frameworks
424 mention explicit thresholds. Given the diversity of payers
425 and healthcare organizations, it should be noted that there
426 are differences in the thresholds used. A high-profile
427 example of explicit reference to thresholds is the use of
428 $100,000–$150,000/QALY for a value-based price
429 benchmark by the Institute for Clinical and Economic
430 Review (ICER) [35], a trusted non-profit organization that
431 evaluates evidence on new technologies in the US. Premera
432 Blue Cross, a large not-for-profit health plan in the Pacific
433 Northwest, uses value-based formulary tiers based on
434 ICER thresholds—drugs are allocated to one of the four co-
435payment tiers (tier 1,\$10,000/QALY; tier 2, $10,000 to
436\$50,000/QALY; tier 3, $50,000 to\$150,000/QALY;
437and tier 4,[$150,000/QALY) [36].
4383.2 Heuristics for the Threshold Value: WHO-
439CHOICE (One to Three Times a Country’s
440Gross Domestic Product)
441One to three times a country’s annual GDP per capita has
442been a widely used threshold for CE studies within global
443health, mainly among studies focused on LMICs [1, 37]. A
444recent study found that the proportion of LMICs citing this
445threshold has substantially increased over time, with 10%
446of studies citing this threshold in the early 2000s, to 76%
447between 2013 and 2015 [37]. While the origins for its
448intended use for CEA are less clear, the WHO first used
449these values in its 2001 Commission on Macroeconomics
450and Health (CMH) report [38]. While this report intuitively
451equates a year of life to per capita income, considering
452productivity and leisure time, it used per capita income to
453value the economic loss resulting from the burden of major
454diseases impacting countries. Despite its variant aim, the
455WHO-CHOICE thereafter adopted this range for promot-
456ing CEA [21, 38]. There have recently been several opin-
457ions on this threshold value that have motivated calls for
458consensus and new primary research [8, 9, 37, 39–43]. For
459instance, some analysts have argued that CE thresholds
460reflecting opportunity costs are much lower than the one to
461three times GDP per capita rule of thumb, while other
462analysts encourage applying a range of income elasticity
463estimates to account for the relationship between the value
464per statistical life (VSL) and income [39]. The WHO has
465since backed away from this threshold range and recog-
466nizes its limitations for CEA [8].
4673.3 Implied/Unspecified Thresholds
468A recent systematic overview of CE thresholds suggested
469that many countries do not specify a threshold [26]. While
470researchers analysed previous decisions to identify the
471threshold value in these countries, they were unable to pin
472down a single number. Nevertheless, the manner in which
473these countries use different CE thresholds is briefly
474described below.
4753.3.1 Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee
476The Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC)
477in Australia does not formally specify a CE threshold.
478However, the cost per QALY of the technology is reported
479as belonging to one of four bands, i.e. AUS$15,000–
480$45,000; $45,000–$75,000; $75,000–$105,000; $105,000–
481$200,000. A recent study by Paris and Belloni [44] at the
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482 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
483 (OECD) suggested that technologies with ICERs greater
484 than $75,000/QALY were rarely recommended and those
485 greater than $45,000/QALY were recommended only in
486 exceptional circumstances, where there was high clinical
487 need and no alternative treatment. These findings are
488 similar to those observed by Henry et al. in their retro-
489 spective analysis of PBAC decisions [45].
490 3.3.2 Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies
491 While the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in
492 Health (CADTH) guidelines for the economic evaluation
493 of health technologies recommend the use of a ‘supply-
494 side’ estimate of the CE threshold, that value is not given in
495 the guidance [4]. While the reporting sometimes refers to
496 the $50,000/QALY threshold (for example, the probability
497 of being CE was x% at a threshold of $50,000/QALY), a
498 review of all the publically available CADTH appraisals
499 performed by Griffiths and Vadlamudi [46] suggested that
500 this threshold is not consistently applied, with several
501 technologies recommended with ICERs above $50,000 per
502 QALY, while many were rejected with ICERs below this
503 threshold.
504 3.3.3 New Zealand
505 The Pharmaceutical Management Agency (PHARMAC) in
506 New Zealand state that they do not have a CE threshold
507 [47]. While researchers have tried to imply the threshold
508 from previous decisions [48, 49], PHARMAC states that
509 they fund medicines within a fixed budget, and as CE is
510 only one of its nine decision criteria used to inform deci-
511 sions, thresholds cannot be inferred or calculated [50].
512 They also note that CE estimates for PHARMAC’s
513 investments has ranged between -NZ$40,000 (net cost
514 savings to the health sector for health gains) to over
515 ?NZ$200,000 per QALY (- €20,000 to ? €100,000) [51].
516 3.3.4 Other Countries
517 Other countries, including Scotland [52], Korea [53] and
518 Brazil [54], use CE analyses for decision making but do not
519 explicitly specify a threshold.
520 4 Present: Empirical Estimates of Cost-
521 Effectiveness (CE) Threshold
522 Recently, some countries have begun to conduct empirical
523 research to identify CE thresholds for their setting. These
524 studies have broadly been classified as either supply- or
525 demand-side estimates [10]. Supply-side estimates aim to
526reflect the opportunity cost of spending on health by link-
527ing the healthcare expenditure to health outcomes, while
528the demand-side estimates aim to reflect societal WTP for
529improvements in health.
5304.1 Supply-Side Thresholds
531It should be noted that the example in Sect. 2 illustrates an
532ideal situation in which the budget allocation is optimal; it
533is easy to identify the least cost-effective intervention(s),
534and the system (decision makers) only displace these least
535cost-effective interventions. This is a ‘first best’ situation;
536however, in practice, this is not always the case. In com-
537plex systems, the existing healthcare package may not be
538optimal, it may not be possible to specify exactly what
539activities are displaced, and decisions about disinvestment
540may be left to other decision makers in the system, for
541example at a local level. Thus, in empirically estimating
542the threshold, the aim is to estimate the shadow price of the
543budget in terms of the interventions that are likely to be
544displaced [42]. This is what Culyer describes as an
545approach to estimating the ‘second best’ threshold [7].
546These empirical estimates of the supply-side threshold tend
547to reflect the marginal productivity of the healthcare sys-
548tem, derived from the relationship between changes in
549healthcare expenditure and health outcomes, where
550expenditures at the margin may be committed to a mix of
551cost-effective and cost-ineffective interventions (i.e. inter-
552ventions with a range of cost per QALYs) [7]. In a world
553where the assumptions of the optimization model are met,
554this conceptualization of the threshold should result in the
555same value as that which is derived by solving the con-
556strained optimization problem. However, where the nec-
557essary assumptions as set out in the preceding section are
558not met, the values may differ. The ‘second best’ approach
559provides an estimate that best informs the expected health
560opportunity costs of a new intervention and, therefore, if
561robustly estimated, can be better relied on to inform whe-
562ther a new intervention is expected to result in a net health
563gain or net health loss.
564There are challenges involved in estimating the rela-
565tionship between changes in healthcare expenditure and
566health outcomes, i.e. the marginal productivity of the
567healthcare system. Given the outcome of interest is QALYs
568[a combination of quality of life (QoL) and life-years
569(LYs)], there is a need to link the healthcare expenditure to
570mortality (to estimate the effect on LYs) and morbidity (to
571estimate the effect on QoL). The data on healthcare
572expenditure and its effect on mortality/morbidity may not
573always be readily available and, as such, assumptions are
574often required. Furthermore, there are also econometric
575challenges that include, but are not limited to, issues
576around controlling for the many non-healthcare factors that
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577 affect health [55], which if not properly accounted for may
578 lead to biased and inconsistent estimates. To date, such
579 within-country estimation has been undertaken in relatively
580 few countries, which are described below alongside one
581 example where cross-country data have been used to esti-
582 mate these values for a number of countries.
583 4.1.1 UK
584 Claxton et al. [42] empirically estimated the CE threshold
585 for the NHS in the UK to be £12,936 per QALY. They used
586 the English NHS programme budgeting data to estimate the
587 relationship between changes in overall NHS expenditure
588 and changes in mortality/LYs gained, and subsequently
589 extended this to QALYs. Their ‘structural’ uncertainty
590 suggested that the estimate is likely to be an overestimate
591 and reported that the probability the threshold is less than
592 £20,000 per QALY is 0.89, and the probability that it is less
593 than £30,000 per QALY is 0.97. The assumptions made in
594 the estimation of the UK threshold have been discussed in a
595 number of publications [28, 56, 57].
596 4.1.2 Australia
597 Edney et al. [58] estimated the CE threshold, called the
598 reference ICER, for Australia. They used an instrumental
599 variable two-stage least squares regression to estimate the
600 effect of changes in health expenditure on QALYs due to
601 reduced mortality. Further empirical analysis was then used
602 to inform the effect of health expenditure in terms of
603 QALYs due to reduced morbidity. These are then com-
604 bined to produce a central estimate of the reference ICER,
605 which represents the average opportunity costs of decisions
606 to fund new technologies, i.e. AUS$28,033/QALY.
607 4.1.3 Spain
608 Vallejo-Torres et al. [59] estimated the CE threshold for
609 the Spanish NHS. They used 5 years of data across the 17
610 regional health services in Spain to regress quality-adjusted
611 life expectancy (QALE) against health spending, control-
612 ling for region and year fixed effects, and a comprehensive
613 set of time- and region-variant indicators, applying a 1-year
614 lag to expenditure. They report that health expenditure has
615 a positive and significant effect on QALE, with an average
616 spending elasticity of 0.07, which translates into a cost per
617 QALY of between €21,000 and €24,000.
618 4.1.4 Low- to Middle-Income Countries CE Thresholds
619 Ochalek [41] estimate CE thresholds for 123 LMICs using
620 estimates of the effect of a change in government spending
621 on health on health outcomes from cross-country data.
622Their study expands on existing studies within the litera-
623ture estimating the effect of a change in spending on
624mortality outcomes to estimate the effect of a change in
625spending on a range of mortality and morbidity outcomes.
626Using data on each country’s demography (i.e. the sex and
627age structure of the population), epidemiology (i.e.
628underlying mortality and morbidity burden) and health
629expenditure, they were able to generate a range of cost per
630DALY averted estimates for 123 countries that captures
631some of the structural uncertainty associated with these
632estimates. Their results aim to reflect the rate at which the
633healthcare system in a given country is able to produce
634health, and, as such, can be used to inform health oppor-
635tunity costs. For example, they have been used to help
636guide decisions around the design of the Essential Health
637Package in Malawi [60, 61].
6384.2 Demand-Side Thresholds
639The empirical methods of estimating demand-side thresh-
640olds, namely WTP and value of a statistical life studies, are
641reviewed and discussed in detail by Vallejo-Torres et al.
642[10]. Below, we offer a brief description of the application
643of these methods in policy in two countries—Thailand and
644Malaysia.
6454.2.1 Thailand (Health Intervention and Technology
646Assessment Program)
647The Health Intervention and Technology Assessment Pro-
648gram (HITAP) in Thailand elicited the WTP for a QALY in
649the Thai healthcare setting [62]. The results of this study
650were adopted by decision-making bodies as the appropriate
651threshold for health investment in the Thai setting; the
652ceiling threshold is reported to be 160,000 Baht per QALY,
653which is approximately 1.2 times Gross National Income
654(GNI) per capita [63]. However, they also note that this
655single threshold is not used for resource allocation of all
656types of interventions; for example, sometimes medicines
657that treat rare diseases are included in the National List of
658Essential Medicines (NLEM) even though their ICER is
659much higher than the threshold.
6604.2.2 Malaysia
661Lim et al. conducted a cross-sectional, contingent valuation
662study in four states of Malaysia to estimate the CE
663threshold for healthcare interventions as WTP for a QALY
664[64]. One thousand and thirteen respondents were inter-
665viewed in person for their socioeconomic background,
666QoL, and WTP for a hypothetical scenario. The authors
667reported that the CE thresholds ranged from MYR12,810 to
668MYR28,470 (US$4000–US$8900) and education level,
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669 estimated monthly household income, and the description
670 of health state scenarios had the biggest effect on the WTP
671 estimates. They concluded that there is no single WTP
672 value for a QALY and that the CE threshold estimated for
673 Malaysia was found to be lower than the threshold value
674 recommended by the WHO (i.e. one and three times the
675 GDP per capita, which was approximately $10,000 and
676 $30,000, respectively, in 2017) [65].
677 5 Future: Beyond Quality-Adjusted Life-Years
678 (QALYs)? Other Sectors?
679 Most of the work on CE thresholds has been based on using
680 QALYs (or DALYs) as the measure of effectiveness.
681 However, there have recently been some developments that
682 suggest an inclination to go beyond these measures of
683 health benefit, including the recent work on value frame-
684 works [66], which mentions a number of additional criteria
685 in addition to QALYs or DALYs, and the recommendation
686 statement from the Second Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in
687 Health and Medicine [67, 68], which supports the use of a
688 societal perspective. The impact of these recommendations
689 is discussed in brief below.
690 5.1 Thresholds for Benefits Beyond QALYs
691 Alongside the recent work on value frameworks [66],
692 which mentions many additional criteria beyond QALYs, it
693 is widely acknowledged that many HTA organizations
694 consider multiple factors alongside CE [69]. More recently,
695 there have been calls for including these multiple criteria
696 explicitly in the assessment of value [70], using techniques
697 such as multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA) [71]. The
698 current CE thresholds are based on QALYs (or DALYs)
699 being the measure of effectiveness. If the value is redefined
700 to include multiple criteria beyond QALYs (or DALYs),
701 the measure of effectiveness is not QALYs (or DALYs)
702 anymore but rather a new composite measure of effec-
703 tiveness. As such, the threshold will need to be re-esti-
704 mated for this new measure of ‘effectiveness’ to reflect the
705 opportunity costs [6]. As observed in Sect. 4 (the empirical
706 estimates of the supply-side thresholds), this poses a sig-
707 nificant informational challenge in identifying the marginal
708 impacts on the different criteria that make up the overall
709 effectiveness.
710 5.2 Thresholds in Other Sectors
711 The Second Panel on Cost-Effectiveness in Health and
712 Medicine [67, 68] supports a societal perspective and
713 recommends the use of an ‘impact inventory’—a structured
714 table listing the health and non-health effects of an
715intervention that should be considered in a societal refer-
716ence-case analysis. To evaluate interventions crossing
717multiple sectors, sector-specific thresholds are needed that
718represent the sector-specific outcome that would be for-
719gone as the result of the additional costs of a new inter-
720vention. To date, no sector outside of healthcare has
721established a threshold. While some sectors have estab-
722lished measures, such as the Adult Social Care Outcomes
723Toolkit (ASCOT) used to estimate social care-related QoL
724(SCRQoL), many sectors do not have standard definitions
725for their outcomes. The challenges involved in performing
726CEA when the intervention concerns multiple sectors are
727highlighted by Remme et al. [72].
7286 Key Issues/Misconceptions with Thresholds
7296.1 Which Thresholds Should be Used?
730Unless there is clear reason to choose a different threshold
731value (e.g. political sensitivity), empirical estimates pro-
732vide a more appropriate value of the threshold than his-
733torical/heuristic thresholds, which are based on judgement.
734The key question is whether supply-side thresholds (which
735aim to represent the opportunity cost of investment to the
736system, given budget constraints) or demand-side thresh-
737olds (WTP estimates that aim to reflect the value that
738society places on a QALY) should be used [10]. A recent
739systematic review of WTP per QALY studies suggested
740that WTP per QALY varied substantially by condition,
741especially those for extending or saving life and improving
742QoL [73]. Supply-side thresholds enable the quantification
743of the net health gains (or losses) that would result from the
744inclusion of a new intervention (whether doing so repre-
745sents an increase in the budget or displaces a currently
746funded intervention[s]) in the healthcare system. Decisions
747made on the basis of supply-side CE thresholds ensure that
748aggregate health is improved by the inclusion of new
749interventions.
750On the other hand, thresholds based on WTP for a
751QALY are generally higher than thresholds resulting from
752estimating the opportunity cost to the healthcare system
753[10]. As such, using WTP estimates may lead to decisions
754that reduce rather than improve health outcomes overall.
755This may also be the case with the use of WHO-CHOICE
756guidelines for thresholds (i.e. one to three times the GDP),
757where the threshold is not related to the efficiency of the
758healthcare system. However, as WTP estimates reflect
759societal WTP for improvements in health, the fact that they
760tend to be higher than estimates linked to the efficiency of
761the healthcare system provides suggestive evidence for an
762increase in public budgets for healthcare. Some analysts
763have argued that in a privately funded healthcare system, in
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764 the absence of explicit healthcare budget constraint, WTP
765 can be an estimate of the opportunity cost of private con-
766 sumption [2].
767 6.2 Should the Threshold be Made Explicit?
768 There are two questions here: (1) whether there can be a
769 single threshold, and (2) whether the threshold values
770 should be made public. No HTA organization currently
771 recommends the use of a single threshold, and many do not
772 explicitly specify a threshold at all (as seen in Sect. 3).
773 Those that specify a threshold tend to specify a range rather
774 than a single value reflecting the belief that a single
775 threshold should not be applied to the diverse range of
776 technologies and conditions. In terms of the second ques-
777 tion, the so-called ‘silence of the lambda’ [74] or reluc-
778 tance to set out an explicit threshold, may result from a
779 number of concerns, including fear of gaming by phar-
780 maceutical companies to target ICERs just below the
781 threshold, reduced flexibility to balance competing criteria
782 when making funding decisions, and the issues associated
783 with advocating a threshold value that may have little or no
784 empirical basis (such as the potential for political and
785 ethical concerns about the accuracy and validity of funding
786 decisions) [75].
787 6.3 Impact of Using the Wrong Threshold
788 If the threshold used is lower than the empirical estimate, it
789 may lead to potentially cost-effective (compared with the
790 empirical threshold) technologies not being reimbursed.
791 However, it should be noted that in situations where
792 researchers suggested increasing the threshold [76], argu-
793 ments were based on WTP/preference estimates. On the
794 other hand, if the threshold used is higher than the
795 empirical estimate reflecting health opportunity costs, each
796 new technology approved (with a higher ICER than the
797 empirical threshold) leads to loss in health outcomes. An
798 example is NICE’s end-of-life decision-making scheme,
799 where it was suggested that approving drugs with an ICER
800 higher than the NICE threshold of £20 000–£30 000/
801 QALY resulted in substantial QALY losses [77]. Further-
802 more, Claxton et al. [31] argue that the current NICE
803 threshold (of £20 000–£30 000/QALY) is too high com-
804 pared with the empirical estimates, suggesting that
805 approving drugs lead to more health likely to be lost than
806 gained.
807 6.4 Threshold and Budget Impact
808 If the budget impact of a new technology is substantial (i.e.
809 non-marginal), the threshold used should be lower,
810 reflecting the size of the budget impact, as the new
811technology will displace a large proportion of the existing
812health services (see example in Sect. 2.1) [78]. The recent
813hepatitis C drugs highlight this issue; while the new hep-
814atitis C drugs were very cost effective, their budget impact
815was quite substantial [79]. ICER in the US has a limit for
816budget impact ($915 million/year for 2017–2018) designed
817to alert policy makers that funding the new service may be
818difficult without displacing other needed services or
819increasing the healthcare insurance costs [35]. In the UK,
820for cost-effective technologies with significant budget
821impact (NICE use a ‘budget impact threshold’ of £20
822million per year), special arrangements need to be agreed
823in dialogue with companies to better manage the intro-
824duction of these technologies in the NHS [80].
8256.5 Threshold and Inflation
826Many have argued for a higher threshold as the values used
827by NICE, PBAC, the US, etc., have remained the same
828since they were first introduced [81]. In the absence of an
829explicit healthcare budget constraint, inflation can poten-
830tially affect the WTP estimates of the threshold; however,
831if the threshold is linked to the efficiency of the healthcare
832system (i.e. CE of the displaced services), it is not related
833to inflation. If a health service became more efficient over
834time (i.e. the displaced activities become more cost effec-
835tive over time), the threshold will fall irrespective of
836inflation. This argument is also applicable for the trans-
837ferability of thresholds between countries. Rather than
838relying on generic metrics such as GDP (e.g. WHO-
839CHOICE guidelines for thresholds of one to three times the
840GDP) or exchange rates, the thresholds should be deter-
841mined by estimating the efficiency of the healthcare sys-
842tem, as observed in Sect. 4.
8436.6 Threshold and Capacity Constraints
844Published CEA studies often ignore the capacity con-
845straints of resources (e.g. beds, nurses, equipment, etc.),
846which may result in biased estimates of CE [82]. In prin-
847ciple, if perfect information was available, these capacity
848constraints can be added, on top of the budget constraint,
849into the optimization problem to estimate the ‘new’ CE
850threshold that takes into consideration the scarcity of
851resources. However, this perfect information is not avail-
852able in reality and thus these capacity constraints are
853incorporated within CE modelling to understand their
854impact on the standard of care and the implementation of
855the new technology [83].
856Where perfect information about capacity constraints
857does not exist, empirically estimated ‘supply side’ CE
858thresholds can be used to determine the expected value of
859reducing or removing such constraints, either specific to
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860 interventions or across the healthcare system as a whole.
861 This expected value can be used alongside information
862 (e.g. based on expert opinion) about the costs and benefits
863 of removing different constraints to prioritise policies to
864 reduce or remove constraints to scale up the implementa-
865 tion of interventions [61].
866 6.7 Priority-Setting Process
867 Alongside the results of CEA, a number of other factors are
868 often also considered as part of the appraisal process
869 around whether to adopt or reject an intervention. A recent
870 review of all HTA appraisals between May 2000 to May
871 2014 from the NICE, PBAC, Scottish Medicines Consor-
872 tium, and CADTH suggested that technologies with ICERs
873 higher than the respective thresholds are sometimes rec-
874 ommended; the reasons included high clinical benefit over
875 the standard of care, and addressing an unmet therapeutic
876 need [84]. Similarly, even though some technologies (such
877 as orphan drugs for rare diseases, or cancer treatments at
878 end of life) have very high ICERs, NICE and most other
879 health systems have found ways to fund those few tech-
880 nologies on the basis of evidence of benefit. On the other
881 hand, some interventions are rejected, even when the
882 ICERs are below the threshold [46]. Indeed, it is
883 acknowledged that there is a need for some discretion in
884 priority setting linked to legitimation of decisions rather
885 than using the threshold alone.
886 7 Conclusions
887 This paper contributes to the literature on CE thresholds by
888 providing a simple illustration of the CE threshold as the
889 shadow price of budget constraint, providing a theoretical
890 framework for how a CE threshold could be employed in a
891 hypothetical optimization setting. Existing estimates of
892 ‘thresholds’ representing various definitions, from heuris-
893 tics applied historically to more recent empirical estimates,
894 whether WTP for improvements in health or opportunity
895 costs are then outlined. Among these, those that can be
896 categorized as supply-side estimates (i.e. from the UK,
897 Australia, Spain and LMICs, as presented in Sect. 4.1) may
898 be considered more appropriate for judging the CE of new
899 technologies where the aim of agencies is to inform whe-
900 ther or not a new technology is expected to improve pop-
901 ulation health. Finally, the future for CE thresholds is
902 speculated upon where new policy questions have indi-
903 cated further areas of research where thresholds will be
904 relevant and useful for decision making, particularly the
905 consideration of effects and costs on multiple sectors
906 beyond health where opportunity costs are still relevant.
907 Despite advances in this area of research, there remain
908misconceptions about CE thresholds, the assumptions
909involved and their implications, which this paper aimed to
910highlight. It is the responsibility of all of us to educate
911those who are involved in priority setting about these
912concepts of threshold in order to ensure efficient healthcare
913resource allocation.
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